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What if Romeo “Facebooked” Juliet: A Call 
to Reform Internet Solicitation and Juvenile 




A modern twist on a classic romance: Romeo and Juliet fall in love 
in the twenty-first century. The same youth, naivety, and passion play out 
in the digital age. The families fight over bitcoins and Romeo and Juliet 
exchange tender words of love by iMessage, Tweet, or E-mail. Everything 
is exactly as expected, but tragedy strikes the couple in a way no one saw 
coming.  
In this contemporary tale of young love, both are spared death, but at 
a cost. In this version, Romeo is convicted for internet solicitation of a 
minor and must register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. Not the 
ending you saw coming? Nevertheless, such is the fate of our young 
Romeo, living in 2020, if he pursued Juliet through iMessage, Tweets, or 
E-mail rather than at her balcony window. This unexpected ending to a 
classic love story is the result of outdated and overbroad internet 
solicitation statutes prevalent throughout the United States. To prevent the 
unintended consequences of these laws on adolescent offenders, this 
Comment recommends that states: (1) revise their statutes to reflect an 
exception for adolescent offenders; (2) allow the judiciary the discretion 
to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis; or (3) offer adolescents a 
meaningful opportunity for review or appeal of their registration 
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The sounds of typing overcome the din of a busy household as 
ROMEO sits on the living room couch, staring at his laptop screen. He 
smiles, sheepishly, looking up as he thinks of what to say next. Returning 
his gaze to the screen, he types quickly “WYD?”1 and awaits a reply. Three 
 
1. The phrase “WYD” is a texting abbreviation generally meaning “what (are) you 
doing.” See wyd, DICTIONARY.COM, https://bit.ly/2CyYTkh (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
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little dots appear. He waits, anxiously, for the three little dots to give way 
to a little grey bubble with a text from his beloved.  
ROMEO furrows his brow as the dots disappear, then reappear, then 
disappear again, before finally receiving the long-awaited message: 
“NMU?”2 At last, JULIET has replied. The conversation continues until, 
finally, the pair arrange to meet up next Friday after the football game, 
behind the bleachers, 9:00 pm. ROMEO types, “cool.” JULIET replies, 
“cul8r.”3 End scene. 
But the modern version of the traditional love story as you know it 
ends there. After meeting up behind the bleachers to have sex, Romeo is 
arrested and charged with violating the Verona internet solicitation statute. 
Convicted of this crime, Romeo must register as a sex offender for the rest 
of his life. Now that is a tragedy that even Shakespeare would not write.4 
To save the fate of our modern Romeo, this Comment argues that 
states must revise their respective internet solicitation statutes to reflect 
the rapid growth of internet-based communication between adolescents.5 
Part II of this Comment will explain how internet solicitation statutes6 
became a threat to adolescent communication and romance by examining 
the statutes themselves.7 Part II will also address how societal 
understanding of the internet has changed during the decades since the 
statutes were enacted.8  
Part II then examines why these statutes now pose a threat to 
adolescent communication: changes to sex offender registries9 and the 
explosion of internet-based communication.10 Additionally, Part II will 
address how courts apply internet solicitation statutes to adolescent 
offenders today11 and the legal distinctions between juvenile and adult 
offenders.12 Part III analyzes how the inclusion of juveniles on sex 
 
2. The phrase “NMU” is also a texting abbreviation meaning “Not much, you?” It is 
often used as a reply to the question “What are you doing?” See NMU, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://bit.ly/2W6kR75 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
3. The phrase “cul8r” is a texting abbreviation meaning “see you later.” See CUL8R, 
URBANDICTIONARY.COM, https://bit.ly/2W3mbaJ (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
4. For the purpose of this Comment, the author presumes most adolescents implicated 
by the intersection of sex offender registration and internet solicitation statutes share the 
following characteristics of Romeo: juvenile, close in age to the “victim,” and are engaged 
in a consensual sexual relationship. The author recognizes that not all juveniles convicted 
of internet solicitation fit these characteristics, however, the appropriate application of 
internet solicitation statutes to such individuals is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
5. See infra Section II.C. 
6. See infra Section II.A. 
7. See infra Section II.A.2. 
8. See infra Section II.A.3. 
9. See infra Section II.B.2. 
10. See infra Section II.C.  
11. See infra Section II.E.1. 
12. See infra Section II.F. 
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offender registries,13 despite the constitutional differences between 
juveniles and adults,14 compounds the threat internet solicitation statutes 
pose to adolescent romantic communication.15 Thus, Part III recommends 
three courses of action to remedy the problem of punishing adolescent 
sexual communications.16 Part IV offers concluding statements on the 
issues raised herein.17  
II. BACKGROUND 
Nearly every state has enacted “internet solicitation statutes,” which 
prohibit the use of computers or the internet to solicit children18 to engage 
in sexual conduct.19 The influx of these statutes began in the 1990s and 
early 2000s,20 responding to the growing public fear of child sexual 
exploitation by electronic or technological means.21  
While state legislatures were enacting new laws to prohibit the 
internet solicitation of children,22 the federal government was attempting 
to regulate sex offenders.23 Thus, the early 2000s introduced laws that 
protected children from sexual predators but also included children on sex 
offender registries.24 In 2009, just a few years after juveniles were included 
on sex offender registries, the Department of Justice estimated that 
juveniles accounted for more than one-third of all registered sex offenders 
in the United States.25 Although child sexual exploitation over the internet 
 
13. See infra Section III.B. 
14. See infra Section III.C. 
15. See infra Section III.A. 
16. See infra Section III.D. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. Throughout this Comment, the terms “children” and “adolescents” refer to legal 
minors of distinct age groups. In this Comment, the term “children” refers to minors aged 
0–12 years and the term “adolescents” refers to minors aged 13–17 years. The terms 
“minor,” “legal minor,” or “juvenile” refer to individuals under 18 years of age.  
19. See State Laws: Electronic Solicitation or Luring of Children, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://bit.ly/2F2nimI. 
20. See infra Section II.A. 
21. See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., THE CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH 
CENTER, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION’S YOUTH at ix (2000) (noting 
that “[a]pproximately one in five [children between the ages of 10 to 17] received a sexual 
solicitation or approach over the Internet in the last year”). 
22. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009); see 
also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007). 
23. See Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Ackerman, A Brief History of Major Sex Offender 
Laws, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 50, 55 (Richard G. 
Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
24. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2006)). 
25. See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., JUVENILES WHO COMMIT SEX OFFENSES AGAINST 
MINORS 1–2 (2009), available at https://bit.ly/2RAyDQO. But see Alison Parker & Nicole 
Pittman, Raised on the Registry, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 1, 2013), https://bit.ly/1HrFkcV 
(explaining that “[i]t is unknown how many persons are subject to registration laws in the 
United States for crimes committed as children . . . from publicly available national data”); 
2020 WHAT IF ROMEO “FACEBOOKED” JULIET 851 
is still a real concern today,26 the failure of internet solicitation statutes to 
reflect the immense change to our virtual world has opened the door for 
unwitting adolescents to become registered sex offenders.  
A. Internet Solicitation Statutes: “Certain Uses of Computer 
Prohibited”  
Understanding the threat these internet solicitation statutes pose to 
adolescents communicating in the digital age27 requires an analysis of the 
statutes themselves. An examination of these statutes will focus on three 
primary characteristics: their goal,28 their language,29 and what they reflect 
about societal understanding of the internet.30  
1. The Goal 
The development of internet solicitation statutes throughout the 
United States illustrated the growing fears of legislatures and citizens 
when it came to children and the internet.31 In New Hampshire, for 
example, the principal sponsor of the internet solicitation bill articulated 
that the goal was to “provide[] additional protection for our youth by 
increasing penalties for internet crimes.”32  
The New Hampshire legislature generally “viewed individuals who 
use computer online services or internet services to seduce or solicit 
children to engage in certain sexual activities as particularly dangerous.”33 
Internet crimes were considered dangerous because they allowed an adult 
behind the veil of a computer screen to anonymously prowl for children in 
 
HUGH H. HUDSON, WHITE PAPER ON THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY 
ACT OF 2006, at 17 (2008); Map of Registered Sex Offenders, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & 
EXPLOITED CHILD. (Nov. 4, 2011), https://bit.ly/2qqYWsH. 
26. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Richard Pérez-Peña, Wildly Popular App Kik Offers 
Teenagers, and Predators, Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/2rYIhNn.  
27. For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “digital age” is assumed to have the 
same meaning as the “information age.” According to Merriam-Webster, the “information 
age” refers to “time in which information has become a commodity that is quickly and 
widely disseminated and easily available especially through the use of computer 
technology.” Information Age, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2zCbKza (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2020). 
28. See infra Section II.A.1. 
29. See infra Section II.A.2. 
30. See infra Section II.A.3. 
31. See, e.g., An Act Prohibiting Internet Solicitation and Exploitation of Children: 
Hearing on S.B. 495 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2008 Legis. Sess. (N.H. 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Joseph Foster) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. on SB 495]; see also 50 
State Survey of Grooming and Child Solicitation Statutes, A.B.A., (on file with author) 
[hereinafter ABA 50 State Survey]. 
32. Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Sen. Joseph Foster). 
33. State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 111 (N.H. 2018). 
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the safety of their own homes.34 The fears of parents and law 
enforcement35 stemmed from the increasing ubiquity of online chat 
platforms. Indeed, these platforms became increasingly available to 
children and families with “the advent of low cost computers, easily 
available communication channels, and large network systems.”36  
These online chat platforms also allowed for a level of anonymity, 
which was the real danger that parents feared for their children.37 Without 
any identifying feature other than one’s username, users could easily claim 
they were 16-year-old teens when in fact they were “55-year-old 
pedophile[s].”38 With these fears in mind, but with little knowledge of the 
developing technology, citizens looked to their respective legislatures for 
protection.39 
2. The Language  
States vary widely in the breadth of the devices encompassed by their 
internet solicitation statutes.40 Some statutes employ only a few terms to 
establish the kinds of internet or “on-line” communications they prohibit.41 
By comparison, other states use exhaustive lists of devices and methods 
they prohibit.42  
Reflecting a general unfamiliarity with the internet and crimes 
committed therein, some legislatures opted for fewer, broader terms to 
 
34. See Peter Palmer, Somebody To Talk To?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2001, 12:49 PM), 
https://bit.ly/2qrIjwR; see also Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of 
Governor John Lynch, New Hampshire) (explaining the need to prevent “sexual predators 
[from hiding] in the shadows of cyberspace” and to “modernize [New Hampshire] laws to 
protect [New Hampshire] children from the threats of the 21st century”).  
35. See Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Chief Richard 
Gendron, Hudson Police Dept.) (testifying that “91% or seventy-seven million children 
have access to the internet today” and “75% of these children have been aggressively 
solicited” and he explained that he “d[id not] see this ever changing” but instead it would 
only get worse).  
36. MICHAEL L. JAMES ET AL., AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS 
OF ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD USE AND THEIR IMPACT ON OTHER COMMUNICATION 
ACTIVITIES 3 (1993), https://bit.ly/2znvAzu.  
37. See Palmer, supra note 34.  
38. Id. The author does not intend this statement to reflect a belief that only (or all) 
55-year-olds are pedophiles. 
39. See Albert J. Grudzinskas, New Technology Meets Old Law, in ADOLESCENT 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 5–6 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2014); see also 
Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Chief Richard Crate, Enfield 
Police Dept.) (“[W]ith the creation of the internet, a whole new predator has emerged. New 
technology has made it easier for these individuals to enter our homes and exploit our 
children. The predators are using technology and the internet to lure and capture new 
victims for their exploitation.”).  
40. See ABA 50 State Survey, supra note 31.  
41. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009); see also FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 
(2009). 
42. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
122 (2009). 
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encompass a problem they did not fully understand.43 For example, New 
Hampshire law prohibits any person from “knowingly utiliz[ing] a 
computer on-line service, internet service, or local bulletin board service 
to seduce, solicit, lure or entice a child” to commit sexual assault, indecent 
exposure and lewdness, or endangering a child.44 Here, the electronic 
means prohibited are both over- and under-inclusive, allowing courts the 
discretion to apply either a narrow or broad application of the law. 
Similar to the language of the New Hampshire statute,45 Florida law 
largely prohibits the use of the same three electronic mediums for 
soliciting children.46 Yet, the Florida statute slightly expands the list.47 In 
Florida, a “person who knowingly uses a computer Internet service, local 
bulletin board service, or any other device capable of electronic data 
storage or transmission to: (a) Seduce, solicit, lure, or entice” a child to 
engage in sexual conduct, violates Florida law.48 The inclusion of 
“electronic data storage” devices allows the statute to incorporate a 
broader range of technologies that may not yet be known–or even exist—
to fall within the statute’s control. 
By stark contrast, states like Georgia and Alabama compiled more 
thorough lists of the different communication methods the acts are meant 
to encompass.49 For example, Georgia law prohibits the intentional or 
willful use of “a computer wireless service or Internet service, including, 
but not limited to, a local bulletin board service, Internet chat room, e-
mail, instant messaging service, or other electronic device, to seduce, 
solicit, lure, or entice” a child to engage in sexual conduct.50 Unlike New 
Hampshire or Florida, the terms employed by Georgia demonstrate an 
attempt to draft a more pointed and specific law. 
Even more expansive than the language in the Georgia statute, 
Alabama law51 provides an extensive list of both the actions and 
technologies the statute seeks to prohibit.52 First, the statute does not 
merely address actions which “solicit, entice, or lure” children.53 The 
Alabama statute instead prohibits any individual who “knowingly, with 
the intent to commit an unlawful sex act, entices, induces, persuades, 
seduces, prevails, advises, coerces, lures, or orders” a child to engage in 
 
43. See ABA 50 State Survey, supra note 31. 
44. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009) (emphasis added).  
45. See id.  
46. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (2009). 
47. See id. 
48. Id. (emphasis added).  
49. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
122 (2009).  
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007) (emphasis added). 
51. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009). 
52. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) (2007); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
122 (2009).  
53. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1). But see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009). 
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an illicit sexual act.54 Unlike New Hampshire, Florida, and even Georgia, 
Alabama chose to encompass a wide array of actions in setting the scope 
of child solicitation.55  
Further, unlike most other states’ internet solicitation statutes, 
Alabama’s statute bars a wide variety of specific technologies.56 The 
statute prohibits the use of devices such as: “a computer, on-line service, 
Internet service, Internet bulletin board service, weblog, cellular phone, 
video game system, personal data assistant, telephone, facsimile machine, 
camera, universal serial bus drive, writable compact disc, magnetic 
storage device, floppy disk, or any other electronic communication or 
storage device.”57 Unlike the New Hampshire, Florida, and Georgia 
statutes, the Alabama statute’s nearly exhaustive list leaves less room for 
error or ambiguity in the interpretation of internet solicitation. Notably, 
however, a cautious Alabama legislature still includes a catch-all provision 
at the end of the list to encompass any current or future technologies 
unbeknownst to its members.58 
3. How We Understand the Internet: Then & Now  
Since the enactment of internet solicitation statutes, technology and 
the internet have dramatically changed.59 For example, in the early 2000s, 
DSL technology60 increased the speed at which users could connect to the 
internet.61 A thorough analysis of just how obsolete many of these internet 
solicitation statutes have become relies on an understanding of the way 
society understood technology, then and now.  
a. The Internet of the ‘80s, ‘90s, and 2000s 
In 1980, CompuServe62 launched one of the “earliest commercial 
Internet services” allowing users to sign onto their platform under 
 
54. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009) (emphasis added). 
55. See id. 
56. See ABA 50 State Survey, supra note 31. 
57. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-122 (2009).  
58. See id. 
59. See Caitlin Dewey, A Complete History of the Rise and Fall—And 
Reincarnation!—of the Beloved ‘90s Chatroom, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2014, 2:01 PM), 
https://wapo.st/2RynhIp. 
60. The acronym “DSL” stands for “Digital Subscriber Line” which refers to a 
“networking technology that provides broadband (high-speed) Internet connections over 
conventional telephone lines.” DSL: Networking Technology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://bit.ly/2Drejaw (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).  
61. See Dewey, supra note 59.  
62. CompuServe, then “the nation’s largest vendor of computer services, report[ed] 
that its subscriber base [grew] . . . to well over 200,000 [people in 1985] . . . and offer[ed] 
paid subscribers, among other things, a wide selection of what [were] commonly known as 
electronic bulletin boards.” Martin Lasden, Of Bytes and Bulletin Boards, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 4, 1985), https://nyti.ms/2RQTc6C. “At CompuServe, there are close to 100 bulletin 
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usernames that may (or may not) reflect characteristics about the user in 
real life.63 Services like CompuServe, Prodigy,64 and America On-Line 
(AOL),65 offered users what were known as “electronic bulletin boards.”66  
Electronic bulletin boards were “computerized system[s] used to 
exchange public messages or files.”67 These virtual platforms were 
understood as electronic counterparts to “real” bulletin boards.68 Users 
could “post” messages to be viewed by any member of the group.69 
Messages posted on these “bulletin boards” were arranged in order “of 
subject matter and removed when the quantity [of messages] overload[ed] 
the system.”70 Although most of these messages and message-boards were 
supervised by the chatroom service provider, conversations could also 
occur in private chats that were not monitored or censored.71 
More than ten years after CompuServe and other commercial internet 
services launched, “on-line” communication was still new to the American 
public.72 A 1993 Broadcast Education Association study revealed that “on-
line communication [was] so new that few general communication 
text[books] even mention[ed] its existence.”73 In fact, online 
communication platforms did not reach peak usage until the mid-to-late-
1990s.74 Nonetheless, by 1997, AOL users “spent more than a million 
 
boards to choose from . . . [and it is] even possible to ‘chat’ by computer with another 
computer user live on the other end of the line.” Id.  
63. See Dewey, supra note 59. 
64. Prodigy was a “business information and product marketing service for the 
Internet global web of computer networks.” Peter H. Lewis, Company News; Prodigy 
Developing a Service for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 1994), 
https://nyti.ms/2sKINj2. The service operated at a time when the Internet was described as 
a “loose affiliation of government, university and corporate computer networks on which 
information is available free once someone gets access through an Internet host computer.” 
Id.  
65. AOL, also known as “America On-Line,” is “one of the largest Internet-access 
subscription service companies in the United States, providing a range of Web services for 
users.” AOL, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2UeELLA (last visited Apr. 28, 
2020). 
66. See Dewey, supra note 59.  
67. Bulletin-board system, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2RvJruY (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
68. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 6; see also Peter Kerr, Now Computerized 
Bulletin Boards, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1982), https://nyti.ms/2MUIYBo (“Before 
computers, there were cork bulletin boards . . . [t]his is just the electronic equivalent.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
69. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 6.  
70. Id.  
71. See Palmer, supra note 34. Chatrooms offered users a similar experience, 
providing “online spaces where individuals possessing similar interests might congregate, 
converse, and even share their physical locations to facilitate meeting in person.” Internet: 
Computer Network, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2E10aCl (last visited Apr. 
28, 2020).  
72. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 36, at 4. 
73. Id. 
74. See Dewey, supra note 59.  
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hours chatting each day.”75 Despite the new and relatively unfamiliar 
nature of these communication platforms, they quickly developed a 
reputation for their “shady, transgressive” possibilities.76 
b. Modern Understanding 
In the decades since the launch and use of electronic bulletin-board 
systems, the way people accessed and interacted on the internet changed 
tremendously.77 One important change that sparked a new understanding 
of technology and the internet was the launch of social networking or 
“social media” websites.78 Websites like Friendster,79 Myspace,80 and 
Facebook81 soon spelled disaster for the once popular chatrooms.82 Unlike 
the electronic bulletin boards and chatrooms of the 1990s, in which 
anonymity was central to the fun and mystique of the platform,83 modern 
social websites appeal to users for the opposite reason.84 On these new 
platforms “[w]ho you are in real life is frequently . . . the only thing that 
matters.”85 This emphasis on a person’s real identity when communicating 
online86 is an important distinction from the way internet communication 
was understood in the 1990s and 2000s.87 
A comparison of the websites frequented by modern internet users 
and the terms of these internet solicitation statutes themselves exemplifies 
the drastically different understanding of the internet at the time of drafting 
than in the modern age. During the 1990s, when many states adopted 
 
75. Id.  
76. See id.  
77. See id.; see also Judiciary Comm. on SB 495, supra note 31 (statement of Chief 
Richard Gendron, Hudson Police Dept.) (noting the ongoing changes in technology and 
explaining that in 2008, the Hudson Police Department was “now seeing text messages” 
arise in addition to traditional communications over the computer).  
78. See Dewey, supra note 59. 
79. Friendster is a popular “online social network” that enables “people to stay in 
touch with friends, family, school, social groups, activities, and interests, as well as to 
discover new people and things that are important to them.” Friendster Company 
Overview, BLOOMBERG, https://bloom.bg/2sHnrmn (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).  
80. Myspace is a popular “online community portal” that allows “users to create a 
private community where they can share photos, journals, music, and other online media.” 
Myspace Inc, BLOOMBERG, https://bloom.bg/2yWvUsf (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).  
81. Facebook is a “social networking website” that “allows people to communicate 
with their family, friends, and coworkers.” Facebook Inc, BLOOMBERG, 
https://bloom.bg/2VIwbbj (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).  
82. See Dewey, supra note 59.  
83. See id.  
84. See id.  
85. Id. But see Jack Nicas, Oprah, Is That You? On Social Media, the Answer is Often 
No, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2KWRelO (noting how easy it is to make 
fake accounts on social media websites, and how difficult these accounts can be for the 
companies themselves to remove).  
86. See Dewey, supra note 59. 
87. See Palmer, supra note 34. 
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legislation to address issues of the internet, legislatures used terms such as 
“local bulletin board services” to describe the breadth of prohibited 
activities.88 Legislatures seemed to have used the phrase “local bulletin 
board services” to refer to the popular medium of internet communication 
in the 1990s: the chatroom. However, in the digital age, a phrase such as 
“local bulletin board services” has reached such a level of obsolescence in 
modern technology that it effectively prohibits an activity that no longer 
exists.89 
B. Sex Offender Registration 
Although well-intentioned when enacted, these outdated internet 
solicitation statutes have become a threat to modern teens navigating the 
nuances of sexual relationships in the digital age. When state internet 
solicitation statutes do not identify offenders as adults, adolescents 
communicating with their peers (children in the eyes of the law) can 
become swept up like “by-catch.”90 Understanding the threat internet 
solicitation statutes pose to adolescents for their online communications 
first requires an examination of the introduction of juveniles into the sex 
offender registration system.  
1. Before the ‘90s: A Brief History  
The evolution of sex offender registration statutes91 began in the 
decades prior to the 1990s.92 Although the punishment93 of sexual 
offenders in society was not a novel concept in the early twentieth century, 
the laws of the United States during this period marked the codification of 
the societal distaste for sex offenders.94 Legislation categorizing and 
establishing punishment for sex offenders characterized much of the 1930s 
 
88. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2009); see also FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 
(2009).  
89. See Dewey, supra note 59.  
90. The term “by-catch” or “bycatch” refers to “the portion of a commercial fishing 
catch that consists of marine animals caught unintentionally.” Bycatch, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2Oracin (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). Here, the term “by-catch” is 
meant to refer to the unintentional nature of a widely applicable statute (like a large fishing 
net) as it applies to people (like fish) it did not mean to include. 
91. For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “sex offender registration statutes” 
is used to encompass an array of different statutes that target and regulate the behavior of 
sex offenders in the United States. Primarily this phrase references statutes that impose 
requirements of registration, community notification, and residency restriction. See Parker 
& Pittman, supra note 25, at 11.  
92. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 51. 
93. The author recognizes that courts have held that sex offender registration itself 
does not constitute a punishment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dep’t of Justice, 341 P.3d 1075 
(Cal. 2015); People ex rel. J.T., 13 P.3d 321 (Colo. App. 2000). However, in the context 
of this Comment, the author will refer to sex offender registration as a punishment, 
especially as it is applied to juveniles engaged in consensual peer sexual relationships. 
94. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 51. 
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and 1940s.95 Similar to the rise of cases that evoked public outrage and 
legislation in the 1990s, “emotionally charged cases of sexual abuse 
against children [led] to strict policies against sex offenders in the 
1930s.”96  
Beginning in 1937 with the state of Michigan, many states began to 
implement what was termed “mentally disordered sex offender” (MDSO) 
legislation.97 These laws stemmed from the societal belief that “sexual 
psychopathy was a disorder that could be diagnosed and treated.”98 At the 
same time, Florida became the first state to pass legislation “that required 
[sex] offenders of all types to register their addresses with law enforcement 
and agencies upon criminal convictions in an effort to prevent 
reoffending.”99  
In the decades following the enactment of MDSO laws, the United 
States also began changing the way it viewed victims of sexual violence.100 
Prior to the 1970s, for example, there was a “prevailing negative view of 
victims of sexual violence” such that most people “viewed the victims of 
sexual abuse as partially or primarily responsible for their 
victimization.”101 Starting with the feminist movement in the 1970s, 
however, the focus shifted to the perpetrator and away from the victim.102 
2. Sex Offender Registration: ‘80s to Today 
This shift in focus from the victim to the perpetrator was compounded 
by the emergence of multiple high-profile sexual offenses in the 1990s.103 
In response to this wave of salacious crimes, Washington became the first 
state to enact legislation requiring convicted sex offenders to register on a 
public registry in 1990.104 Many states across the nation, and even the 
federal government, quickly followed suit. The 1990s thus began a shift to 
more stringent restrictions on sex offenders in an effort to provide greater 
protection for children.105 The three most notable examples of such 1990s 
 
95. See id. at 59.  
96. Id. at 53.  
97. Id. at 52. MDSO laws offered states a way to “civilly commit sex offenders until 
they were ‘cured.’” Id. Yet, civil commitment for these offenders was not popular for long 
and, by the late 1940s, was widely opposed by many researchers. See id. at 53. 
98. Id. at 52.  
99. Mary K. Evans et al., Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification, in 
SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 142 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2d 
ed. 2015) (“This law used registration to target persons convicted of felonies ‘involving 
moral turpitude.’”). 
100. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 53–54.  
101. Id. at 53. 
102. See id. at 54. 
103. See id. at 55. 
104. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (2005); see also Terry & Ackerman, 
supra note 23, at 57.  
105. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Research Finds Limited Effects 
in New Jersey, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (Jan. 21, 2009), https://bit.ly/2RDOjyr.  
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legislation, known by the names of the children they seek to remember, 
include: the Jacob Wetterling Act,106 Megan’s Law,107 and the Adam 
Walsh Act.108  
First, the United States Congress (Congress) enacted the Jacob 
Wetterling Act to remember Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old boy 
who was killed by a “strange” man with a gun while biking home.109 After 
the death of their son, Jacob’s family started a foundation to protect 
children from sexual exploitation.110 The Wetterlings pushed for 
Minnesota to enact a state sex offender law and later lobbied Congress to 
do the same.111 Nearly five years after Jacob’s murder, in 1994, Congress 
finally passed the first set of federal sex offender laws and enacted the 
Jacob Wetterling Act.112 The act was “intended to help stem the 
international trafficking in sexually exploited children, and to strengthen 
efforts to prevent the sexual abuse of children.”113 In furtherance of these 
goals, the act “prohibit[ed] both domestic interstate and foreign travel for 
the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a person under 18 years of 
age.”114 Although the Jacob Wetterling Act was a federal law, Congress 
encouraged states without existing registration requirements to integrate 
the act into state law by linking state compliance with its terms to the 
continued receipt of federal funds.115  
Generally, the act required states to implement programs under which 
persons “convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor 
or who is convicted of a sexually violent offense to register a current 
address with a designated State law enforcement agency.”116 The 
requirement to register with law enforcement once out of prison, or on 
parole, stemmed from a belief that sex offenders had an extremely high 
 
106. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–73 (repealed 2006). 
107. See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996), repealed and 
replaced by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
120 Stat. 587 (2006). 
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2018). 
109. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57. 
110. See id. (explaining that “many [people] assume[d] that [Jacob’s killer] was one 
of the sex offenders living in a halfway house” in the neighborhood).  
111. See Tanya Rivera, How Jacob Wetterling’s Case Changed Sex Offender Registry 
Laws, WFMY NEWS 2 (Sept. 5, 2016, 7:47 PM), https://on.wfmy.com/2FVl9YU.  
112. See Richard A. Paladino, Note, The Adam Walsh Act as Applied to Juveniles: 
One Size Does Not Fit All, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 274 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 
14071–73 (repealed 2006). 
113. H.R. REP. NO. 103-469, 2d Sess., at 1 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
https://bit.ly/3g2kww9.  
114. Id. 
115. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57 (noting the act required all states to 
comply with some level of sex offender registration in order to maintain 10% of the federal 
funds received from the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act).  
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–73 (repealed 2006). 
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rate of recidivism.117 With the continuing abuse of children, however, 
some people felt that these sex offender registration statutes did not go far 
enough to adequately protect children.118  
In fact, that same year another brutal child-abuse case shocked the 
country: Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl, was raped and murdered.119 
The search for the rapist-murderer revealed he was a neighbor and a two-
time convicted sex offender.120 The news of an unknown, recidivist sexual 
predator living nearby sparked a public outcry for community notification 
of registered sex offenders.121 In response to this outcry, in 1996, Congress 
passed a second federal sex offender law: Megan’s Law.122 With the 
adoption of Megan’s Law, Congress required states to publicize sex 
offender registry information.123 
Accordingly, Megan’s Law required “local law enforcement 
authorities to notify neighbors about a sex offender’s presence in their 
community.”124 The wide adoption of “Megan’s Laws” by the states 
illustrated a national consensus that a process to “register, publicize and 
monitor sex offenders” was the best solution to deal with these “uniquely 
horrific” crimes.125 But the passage of the Jacob Wetterling Act and 
Megan’s Law were not enough to assuage the fears of American parents.  
Ten years after the enactment of Megan’s Law, Congress passed a 
much stricter set of federal regulations for sex offenders: The Adam Walsh 
Act.126 In 1981, Adam Walsh, a six-year-old boy, was abducted while 
shopping at a Florida mall with his mother and later killed.127 In response 
to the death of their son, Adam’s parents created a missing children 
outreach center to lobby for the Missing Children’s Act, which was 
 
117. See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: 
Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 56, 56–57 (2008).  
118. See, e.g., Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57. After Maureen Kanka, Megan 
Kanka’s mother, found out her daughter’s murderer was a “recidivist pedophile” and “lived 
with two other child sexual abusers,” Maureen and her husband “wondered how recidivist 
sex offenders were living in the community without the community’s knowledge.” Id. 
Thus, she “went on a crusade to change the laws arguing that registration, established by 
the Wetterling act, was not a sufficient form of community notification.” Id.  
119. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 276. 
120. See id.  
121. See id.  
122. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 23, at 57.  
123. See Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Effects of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration 
on Adolescent Well-Being: An Empirical Examination, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 105, 
105 (2018), available at https://bit.ly/2DmOV7d. 
124. Roger N. Lancaster, Sex Offenders: The Last Pariahs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2011), https://nyti.ms/1LeIIsF.  
125. See id. (noting the “abduction, rape, and murder of children” is actually 
“exceedingly rare”). 
126. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 277; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–97 (2018). 
127. See Olivia B. Waxman, The U.S. is Still Dealing with the Murder of Adam 
Walsh, TIME (Aug. 10, 2016), http://time.com/4437205/adam-walsh-murder/.  
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enacted in 1982.128 Although widely known as the “Adam Walsh Act” for 
the child it remembers, the act is more often referred to by the first title of 
the act, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).129 
Prior to the enactment of SORNA in 2006, juveniles were not 
considered equal to adult sex offenders in their requirements to register 
and notify the communities in which they lived.130 On the contrary, 
juveniles who committed sex offenses were “not a high priority in the 
[initial] registration and notification legislation” enacted.131  
SORNA thus marked a change in priorities of registration legislation. 
SORNA provides that “juveniles can be equated with adult sex offenders 
regarding registration and notification requirements.”132 SORNA thus 
requires “juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent as a result of 
committing aggravated sexual abuse and were fourteen years of age or 
older at the time to submit to community notification.”133 Further, SORNA 
introduced a new system of classifying offenders.134 SORNA provided that 
the classification (risk level) of sex offenders would be determined solely 
by the crime of conviction, without taking into account any individualized 
risk factors.135 This major change to the consequences for a child or 
juvenile sex offender occurred during an equally transformative time for 
these individuals: the increased use of the internet.  
C. Increased Use of the Internet  
The years since the launch of CompuServe in the 1980s marked the 
categorical increase in computer and internet use by adults and adolescents 
alike.136 Between 1993 and 2007, telecommunications carried by the 
internet increased from 1% to 97%.137 Both adults and children contributed 
 
128. See id.; see also Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 
109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
129. See Paladino, supra note 112, at 271.  
130. See Francis M. Williams, The Problem of Sexual Assault, in SEX OFFENDER 
LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 30 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
131. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY 147 (Franklin E. Zimring ed. 
2004). 
132. Williams, supra note 130, at 30. 
133. Paladino, supra note 112, at 271. SORNA also requires registration for crimes 
that in some jurisdictions may not even constitute a sexual offense. See Parker & Pittman, 
supra note 25, at 13. This broad list of offenses includes: indecent exposure, kidnapping, 
false imprisonment of a child, public urination, rape, incest, indecency with a child by 
touching, and possession of child pornography. See id.  
134. See Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 13 
135. See id. 
136. See Andrew J. Harris, Understanding the World of Digital Youth, in 
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 24, 25 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 
2014). 
137. Id. 
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to this rapid and remarkable increase in internet use.138 Although the 
increased use of digital technologies has “surely altered the norms, 
attitudes, and behaviors” of adults, the internet has “fundamentally shaped 
and defined those of teens and young adults coming of age in the new 
millennium.”139 
In less than two decades, the internet became a ubiquitous presence 
in child and adolescent life.140 In 1984, “27 [%] of students (from pre-
kindergarten through college) used computers at school.”141 Within just 
five years this “number had increased to 43 [%].”142 By 2001, “[a]bout 90 
[%] of children and adolescents ages 5 [to] 17 (47 million persons) use[d] 
computers, and about 59 [%] (31 million persons) use[d] the internet.”143 
As more children and adolescents frequented the internet, at school and at 
home, it offered an “easy and inexpensive” means of communication.144 
In fact, a 2003 study found that both boys and girls “reported devoting 
most of their online time to private communication.”145 The study also 
noted that “[t]he most commonly reported and time-consuming activity 
among participants was instant messaging.”146  
Over the last decade, adolescent use of the internet continues to surge. 
Most recently, a 2018 study revealed that “[s]ome 45% of teens say they 
use the internet ‘almost constantly.’”147 Further, the study found that 
“roughly nine-in-ten teens go online at least multiple times per day.”148 As 
a result of this increase in internet usage, society has dramatically changed 
the “way we consume [information], access information, and interact with 
one another.”149 The shift in adolescent communication from the “real 
world” to the “virtual world” is thus a critical component to the analysis 
of the intersection between internet solicitation statutes and the inclusion 
of juveniles on sex offender registries in recent years.  
 
138. See id. at 27. 
139. Id. 
140. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND 
INTERNET USE BY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN 2001: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS REPORT 3 




144. See Janis Wolak et al., Close Online Relationships in a National Sample of 
Adolescents, 37 ADOLESCENCE 441, 453 (2002).  
145. Eliseva F. Gross, Adolescent Internet use: What we expect, what teens report, 
25 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 633, 642 (2004). 
146. Id. at 641. 
147. Monica Anderson & Jinjin Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology: 2018, PEW 
RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (May 31, 2018), https://pewrsr.ch/2L9CBbf. 
148. Id. 
149. Harris, supra note 136, at 24.  
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D. Adolescent Romance in the Digital Age 
The pervasive use of the internet for communication between 
adolescents has also changed the way adolescents explore sexual 
relationships. Given its increased access and use, the internet has become 
a “key conduit” for adolescents to explore their “emerging sexuality.”150 
Even adolescents themselves describe technology-especially social 
media-as “an integral part of the courting process.”151 
In recent years, the increased use of social networks means that nearly 
every stage of adolescent relationships is now frequently shared online.152 
Adolescents update their social networks by changing their social media 
profiles to reflect their relationship statuses.153 Everything from flirting to 
the status of an adolescent’s relationship occurs in the context of social 
media.154 In a Pew Research Center study, about half of the adolescents 
questioned reported they “have expressed their attraction by liking, 
commenting or otherwise interacting with [their crushes] on social 
media.”155 As digital communications “play a role[] in all aspects of teen 
relationships,”156 adolescents also use the internet to begin communicating 
sexual desires rather than merely flirting with their crushes.157 Adolescents 
who use digital technology to communicate these interests may, therefore, 
find themselves subject to their state’s respective internet solicitation 
statutes.  
E. Electronic Solicitation Statutes in the Digital Era 
The intersection of adolescent communication, sexual relationships, 
and the internet leave the question of whether internet solicitation statutes 
encompass these adolescent communications. Answering this question 
requires an examination of how the courts interpret these statutes. One of 
the only courts to explicitly address the issue, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the interplay between internet 
solicitation and sex offender registration statutes, provides a basis for 
understanding the modern application of these laws.158  
 
150. See Christopher W. Racine & Stephen Bates Billick, Conclusion: 
Understanding Adolescent Sexual Development and the Law in the Digital Era, in 
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE 346, 348 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 
2014). 
151. Dating in the Digital Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2015), 
https://pewrsr.ch/1KMpM1E. 
152. See Harris, supra note 136, at 38. 
153. See id. 
154. See Dating in the Digital Age, supra note 151.  
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. See id. 
158. To the extent no cases were on point in Florida, Georgia, or Alabama, the author 
assumes that courts in these jurisdictions have not yet contemplated the intersection of 
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1. New Hampshire 
In May of 2018, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed the 
interplay between the state’s internet solicitation statute and juvenile sex 
offender registration requirements in State v. Serpa.159 In Serpa, the 
defendant was 18 years old when he “use[d] a computer as a medium to 
propose sex” with the 15-year-old victim.160 On appeal, the defendant 
challenged the imposition of the sex offender registration requirement for 
his internet solicitation conviction because state law did not mandate 
registration for the underlying charge of sexual assault.161  
For sexual assault, New Hampshire law provides an age-based 
exception to the sex offender registration requirement.162 This exception 
also lessens the offense of sexual assault from a felony to a 
misdemeanor.163 Because New Hampshire only mandates sex offender 
registration for felony sexual assault cases, this exception negates the 
registration requirement of offenders when the “age difference between 
the defendant and the victim is ‘4 years or less’ and the victim is ‘13 years 
of age or older and under 16 years of age.’”164  
The court rejected the defendant’s argument and found that the age-
based exception did not extend to the conviction for the internet 
solicitation charge.165 The court clarified that the “unambiguous language 
of the statutes” indicated that this age gap exemption applied only to the 
underlying offense of sexual assault and did not extend to the offense of 
internet solicitation.166 
In holding that the age-based exception to registration did not extend 
to the internet solicitation offense, the court relied on the legislative intent 
underlying the internet solicitation statute.167 The court noted that “[t]he 
 
internet solicitation and juvenile sex offender registration in the digital age. Accordingly, 
an analysis of the implementation of these statutes in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama is not 
possible here.  
159. See State v. Serpa, 187 A.3d 107, 108 (N.H. 2018). 
160. Id. Notably, the defendant in this case was 18 years old, and therefore would not 
be considered a juvenile at the time of the offense. Thus, for the purposes of this Comment, 
his age will be analyzed for its close relation to the age of the victim (as peers) rather than 
his status as a juvenile offender. 
161. See id. 
162. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:4 (2018) (“A person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor . . . when the actor engages in sexual penetration with a person, other than 
the actor’s legal spouse, who is 13 years of age or older and under 16 years of age where 
the age difference between the actor and the other person is 4 years or less . . . [however, 
a] person found guilty under subparagraph I(c) of this section shall not be required to 
register as a sexual offender.”). 
163. See id. 
164. Serpa, 187 A.3d at 108; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:4(I)(c) (2018). 
165. See Serpa, 187 A.3d at 110. 
166. See id. (emphasizing that the two laws “criminalize[d] separate and distinct 
conduct”).  
167. See id. at 111. 
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legislature viewed individuals who use computer online services or 
internet services to seduce or solicit children to engage in certain sexual 
activities as particularly dangerous.”168 Thus, the court was reluctant to 
extend any exceptions to the serious punishment intended by the 
legislature, even for adolescents close in age.169  
Significantly, the court recognized that the change in times between 
the drafting and application of the state’s internet solicitation statute might 
call for a revision of the state’s laws.170 The court noted that “given the 
changes in how young people communicate today, the reasons for the 
distinction drawn by the [registration requirements for the sexual assault 
and internet solicitation statutes] may be diminishing.”171 In upholding the 
sex offender registration requirement for internet solicitation between 
adolescent peers, the court deferred to the authority of the legislature to 
make the appropriate changes to the law.172 
F. The “Problem” of Youth versus Adult Offenders 
What the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized in Serpa is a 
novel issue presented by internet solicitation statutes in a time when sex 
offender registries include juveniles.173 The interaction of internet 
solicitation statutes and juvenile sex offender registration presents the 
question of whether the legislature intended to encompass both adult and 
juvenile offenders. Further, this interplay prompts the question of whether 
adult and juvenile offenders should be punished the same way.  
1. The Supreme Court, Juveniles, and the Eighth 
Amendment  
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet 
answered the question of whether sex offender registration requirements 
should differ between juveniles and adults,174 the Court has indicated that 
these demographics warrant different treatment for severe punishments. In 
the early 2000s, the Supreme Court decided three precedential cases 
establishing a constitutional difference between adolescents and adults as 
to sentencing or punishment.175 Of the three cases, the Supreme Court first 
 
168. Id. (citing State v. Farrington, 20 A.3d 291 (N.H. 2011)).  
169. See id.  
170. See id. at 112. 
171. Id.  
172. See id. (“[I]f changes are to be made [to reflect the change in how adolescents 
communicate in the digital age], the task is that of the legislature, not this court.”). 
173. See id. (noting “the changes in how young people communicate today”). 
174. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 938 (2011) (declining to reach 
the merits of the constitutionality of juvenile sex offender registration, noting the Ninth 
Circuit also lacked authority to do so).  
175. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 
460, 471 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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considered the constitutionality of imposing capital punishment on 
juveniles in Roper v. Simmons.176   
In Roper, the Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on 
juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.177 The Court emphasized that adolescent offenders 
differ from their adult counterparts in three critical ways: maturity, 
susceptibility to outside pressure, and character development.178 Thus, the 
Court held the “Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of 
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their 
crimes were committed.”179 
Since Roper, the Court has continued to uphold the distinction 
between adolescent and adult offenders. In Graham v. Florida,180 the 
Court considered whether imposing a life-without-parole sentence on 
juveniles was constitutional.181 In Graham, the Court emphasized that 
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”182 Because of 
these fundamental differences between adolescents and adults, the Court 
held that life sentences without the possibility of parole, as applied to 
juveniles, violated the Eighth Amendment.183 
Further, in the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama,184 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults . . . 
[b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for 
reform.”185 There, the Court stated that juveniles are  “less deserving of 
the most severe punishments.”186 Further, “[n]o recent data provide[s] 
reason to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of 
juveniles.”187 Accordingly, legislatures should consider the fundamental 
differences between adult and adolescent offenders when administering 
punishments with lifelong consequences. 
2. Juvenile Brain Development  
As recognized by the Supreme Court, the constitutional difference 
between juvenile and adult offenders stems from a fundamental difference 
 
176. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
177. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
178. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.  
179. Id. at 578. 
180. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
181. See id. 
182. Id.  
183. See id.  
184. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.  
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in brain development.188 Studies on juvenile brain development confirm 
that “children, including teenagers, act more irrationally and immaturely 
than adults.”189 These irrational or immature decisions are often due to a 
greater tendency in children to “make decisions based on emotions, such 
as anger or fear, rather than logic and reason.”190 
For adolescents, in particular, poor decision-making is due in part to 
a “present-oriented” line of thinking that “tends to ignore, discount, or not 
fully understand future outcomes and implications.”191 Generally, 
“reasoning capabilities increase through childhood into adolescence and 
younger teens differ substantially from adults in their cognitive 
abilities.”192 Despite these basic biological and psychological 
characteristics of adolescent decision-making, some scholars are reluctant 
to use these traits to excuse juveniles for their indiscretions and crimes.193 
This reluctance stems, in part, from a desire to foster the empowerment of 
adolescents in decisions impacting their own lives.194 Some of these critics 
often “assert[] that, by mid-adolescence, teens’ capacities for 
understanding and reasoning in making decisions roughly approximate 
those of adults.”195  
Yet, the evolution of these cognitive and psychosocial skills plays a 
critical role in shaping the choices—even criminal choices—of 
adolescents.196 This difference in cognitive ability fundamentally 
distinguishes adolescents from adults.197 The continuing development of 
these decision-making skills also reflects the fact that adolescent criminal 
behavior is less likely to reflect bad behavior, compared to similar 
behavior from an adult.198  
3. Undermining the Juvenile Justice System  
Beyond ignoring basic biological differences between adults and 
juveniles, lifetime sex offender registration requirements on adolescents 
belie the purpose of the juvenile justice system. Separating juvenile and 
adult courts sought to provide “rehabilitative alternatives to juveniles.”199 
 
188. See supra Section II.F.1. 
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193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. Id. These critics likely fear a minimalization of adolescent brain development to 
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of adolescent abortion rights.” Id.  
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The Supreme Court also acknowledged rehabilitation to distinguish 
juvenile and adult offenders in its decisions in Graham and Miller.200  
In Graham, the Court noted that juveniles are “more capable of 
change than are adults” and thus juveniles’ actions “are less likely to be 
evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”201 Similarly, in Miller, the 
Court emphasized that courts imposing the “harshest penalties or 
sentences” on juveniles “cannot proceed as though they were not 
children.”202 Although the Court in Miller specifically addressed the 
harshness of imposing life-without-parole sentences on a juvenile 
compared to an adult, imposing lifetime sex offender registration on 
juveniles is likewise harsh compared to the same requirement for adults.  
4. Recidivism 
Juvenile and adult offenders also differ in their respective rates of 
recidivism. First, notably, studies show that recidivism rates among sex 
offenders are significantly lower compared to other criminal offenders.203 
This statistic presents a stark contrast to the belief that sex offenders 
include some of the most dangerous, reoffending criminals in our 
communities.204 
A comparison of the rates of recidivism for adult and juvenile sex 
offenders demonstrates an even lower likelihood of reoffending among 
juveniles.205 On the one hand, research has shown a recidivism rate of 13% 
for adults who commit sex offenses.206 On the other hand, the recidivism 
rates for youth sex offenders average between 4% and 7%.207 In fact, most 
juveniles convicted of sex offenses will not go on to commit these crimes 
as adults.208 Further, “no scientific foundation [exists] for the belief that 
children who commit sexual offenses pose a danger of future sexual 
predation.”209 Accordingly, there is no statistical support for the argument 
that juvenile lifetime sex offender registration makes our communities 
safer.  
 
200. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 
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201. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) 
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202. Miller, 567 U.S. at 474. 
203. See Lancaster, supra note 124; see also Parker & Pittman, supra note 25, at 19 
(comparing the national recidivism rate of 40% for all criminal offenses with the recidivism 
rate of 13% for adult sex offenders).  
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5. Lifetime Implications  
Another major difference between punishments imposed on juveniles 
and adults is that the juvenile will “almost inevitably serve more years and 
a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”210 
Accordingly, the imposition of a lifelong penalty on both adults and 
juveniles is “the same . . . in name only.”211 
Depending on the state and the nature of the underlying crime, the 
impacts of sex offender registration on adolescents can follow them for the 
rest of their lives.212 In many states, these adolescents will face laws that 
restrict where they can “live, work or walk.”213 Additionally, the inclusion 
of offenders’ names and personal information on online registries can 
equate to public stockyards and “digital scarlet letters” for adults—but 
especially children.214 
With the dissemination of juvenile offenders’ names and personal 
information online, the stigma of their offense can follow them 
anywhere.215 This pervasive stigmatization can do “profound damage to a 
child’s development and self-esteem.”216 Additionally, this stigma “lead[s] 
to fear or mistrust by others, suspicion, rejection, or isolation from family 
and friends.”217 By subjecting adolescents to long-term humiliation and 
social barriers, registration “exacerbates the psychological difficulties they 
already experience.”218 
Because of registration, juveniles experience a prolonged stigma with 
potentially violent or even deadly effects. In a recent Human Rights Watch 
report, 52% of interviewed juvenile offenders “experienced violence or 
threats of violence” both against themselves and family members.219 
Further, this constant humiliation and social rejection have led many 
juvenile offenders to attempt death by suicide—some of whom were 
successful.220 The severe consequences of a juvenile’s sex offender 
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registration are onerous and unwarranted, especially given the 
rehabilitative nature of youth.221 
III. ANALYSIS 
As technology continues to progress in the digital age, the issue of 
juvenile sex offender registration is becoming increasingly problematic. 
An understanding of the changes to the internet, communication, and sex 
offender registration provides a means of evaluating how the intersection 
of these laws poses a threat to adolescent sexual relationships.  
A. Internet Solicitation Statutes are Digital Dinosaurs 
Unfortunately for teens navigating sexual relationships in the digital 
age, internet solicitation laws have not aged well.222 The continued use of 
outdated internet solicitation statutes ignores the fact that the internet in 
the digital age is unrecognizable compared to the internet of the 1980s and 
1990s.223 Accordingly, the language used to describe the early years of the 
internet is no longer adequate to address the way adults, teens, or children 
engage with the internet today.224  
The language legislatures employed in these internet solicitation 
statutes disregards the fact that the internet is not special anymore. When 
initially drafted, internet solicitation statutes addressed the novel issue of 
internet communication.225 Today,226 however, communicating over the 
internet is not a novel concept.227 On the contrary, adolescents use the 
internet “almost constantly.”228  
With this pervasive use of the internet to communicate, internet 
solicitation laws effectively punish an adolescent’s choice to use the 
internet rather than another communication channel to engage in 
 
221. See supra Section II.F.3. 
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consensual,229 peer sexual relationships today.230 Punishing adolescents 
for internet-based communication thus implies there is something 
inherently more dangerous about e-mail than a landline.231 Because 
internet solicitation statutes were not originally drafted with such an 
intent;232 courts and legislatures must rectify the way these statutes are 
applied to adolescents communicating on the internet. 
B. The New Problem of Juvenile Sex Offenders 
To effectively modify internet solicitation statutes, legislatures must 
address both adolescents’ pervasive use of the internet233 and the inclusion 
of adolescents on sex offender registries.234 Legislatures drafting internet 
solicitation statutes also did not consider adolescent sexual exploration 
over the internet or even adolescent internet communication at all.235 The 
absence of language limiting the offense to adults236 underscores this 
ignorance of adolescent internet communication. Without limiting 
language, juveniles are thus susceptible to violating the law as they 
navigate consensual sexual relationships via the internet.237  
When internet solicitation laws were first employed, legislators could 
not have conceived of their use against juveniles.238 When legislatures 
drafted these internet solicitation statutes, “[t]he juvenile sex offender was 
not a high priority.”239 Imposing sex offender registration on juveniles for 
violating internet solicitation statutes, thus highlights the need to 
reconsider whom these statutes should target.240  
C. The Constitutional Difference Between Adolescents and 
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Adults  
Differences in adult and adolescent culpability, rehabilitation, and 
recidivism further illustrate how internet solicitation statutes do not 
adequately address the conduct they seek to prohibit.241 Although the 
Supreme Court has not yet answered the constitutional question of lifetime 
sex offender registration for juveniles, the Court has repeatedly upheld the 
constitutional difference between adolescents and adults in terms of the 
proper punishment for each demographic.242 The recognition of 
constitutional differences between juveniles and adults in terms of 
punishment triggers the need to reform state internet solicitation statutes. 
If any statute fails to discriminate between juvenile and adult offenders in 
terms of punishment, a threat to juvenile freedom everywhere remains.243 
D. Recommendations  
States can correct the problem of encompassing adolescents as by-
catch of these internet solicitation statutes by three means.244 Ideally, state 
legislatures should revise internet solicitation statutes to narrow the 
methods prohibited and clarify the age of offenders.245 States should also 
grant judges the discretion to refrain from imposing sex offender status on 
adolescents found in violation of internet solicitation statutes.246 For states 
that continue to require juveniles to register as sex offenders, they should 
adopt a meaningful appellate process in the case of lifetime registration 
requirements.247  
1. Revise Statutes to Address Methods Prohibited and the 
Age of the Offender 
The best solution to the impermissible interplay of internet 
solicitation statutes and juvenile sex offender registration is for state 
legislatures to amend their respective statutes to reflect the internet as used 
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in the digital age.248 As the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted in Serpa, 
state legislatures are in a better position than the courts to reflect societal 
changes—like the pervasive nature of adolescent internet 
communication—in the law.249  
In revising internet solicitation statutes, legislatures should first 
address the target age of offenders.250 The ideal statute would provide an 
age minimum for offenders. For example, legislatures may decide that 
only individuals aged 21 years and older would violate the statute.251 
Further, in cases of consensual sexual relationships arranged over the 
internet, in which both parties are adolescents aged 14 to 18,252 no lifetime 
sex offender registration should be imposed.  
An age-based exception is warranted because a consensual sexual 
relationship between adolescent peers should not be judged equivalent to 
a sexual relationship between an adult and a child.253 Admittedly, even 
adolescent peer intercourse is not harmless,254 however, assigning fault255 
to one party in sexual relationships between adolescent peers becomes 
increasingly difficult.256 Indeed, typically the “exploitation of the young” 
justification for punishing an adult in these circumstances is missing from 
adolescent peer sexual relationships.257 
In fact, some states already recognize that an adolescent peer sexual 
relationship should be treated differently than that between an adult and a 
child.258 Known as “Romeo and Juliet”259 laws, these statutes provide an 
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exception from registration when the offender “[i]s not more than 4 years 
older than the victim . . . who was 13 years of age or older but younger 
than 18 years of age at the time the person” engages in the prohibited 
conduct.260  
“Romeo and Juliet” exceptions recognize that adolescent peers 
engaged in sexual activity are typically “less deserving of a registration 
requirement.”261 Further, these provisions “keep ordinary individuals 
involved in young love from forever being branded sexual offenders.”262 
Despite the insinuations of internet solicitation statutes, there is nothing 
inherently more dangerous about “individuals involved in young love” 
who send an e-mail rather than those who pass a note in class.263 The 
rationale underlying “Romeo and Juliet” provisions should, therefore, 
extend to adolescents using the internet to engage in consensual, peer 
sexual relationships.264 Accordingly, legislatures should amend internet 
solicitation statutes to protect adolescents in sexual relationships from the 
lifelong impact of sex offender registration. 
2. Discretionary Application of Registration Requirements  
Recognizing that the exclusion of all “offenders” under the age of 21 
may unintentionally shield juvenile predators265 because of their age, 
legislatures may be reluctant to adopt such changes. Alternatively, 
legislatures could allow judicial discretion to achieve similar ends. 
Implementing judicial discretion would acknowledge the difference 
between juvenile and adult offenders.266 To accomplish this, states should 
require judges to use discretion and implement validated risk assessments 
to determine the likelihood of recidivism and the threat each juvenile poses 
to the community in the long term. 
The risk assessment should use criteria to evaluate the risk, 
culpability, and developmental status of the offender.267 Prior to imposing 
sex offender registration for juveniles, there should be an evidentiary 
hearing in which a judge sets forth the relevant factors for when to require 
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registration.268 In applying these factors, judges should find by clear and 
convincing evidence that a “validated risk assessment tool” indicates the 
juvenile poses a high risk of sexual reoffending.269 The registration 
requirement should be imposed only if registration is determined to be the 
least restrictive means of ensuring public safety.270  
Requiring a finding of high risk and a lack of suitable alternatives to 
ensure public safety will allow courts to provide for the interests of both 
the juvenile and the community.271 This discretion would allow judges to 
balance the likelihood that registration would adequately deter future 
crime with the harmful effects of registration on juveniles, on a case-by-
case basis.272 Although an imperfect solution, this discretion could provide 
some relief in cases where juveniles would otherwise find themselves 
equated to middle-aged pedophiles.273 
3. Meaningful Review or Appeal Process  
For states that require lifetime registry for those convicted of internet 
solicitation offenses, juvenile offenders should be offered an opportunity 
to appeal on a demonstration of reform or rehabilitation. This appeal 
would recognize a major difference between juvenile and adult offenders: 
the reformative capacity of youth.274 Encouraging juvenile offenders’ 
rehabilitation would also align with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Roper, Graham, and Miller.275   
 Some states have already adopted measures to allow juveniles relief 
from sex offender registration. Alabama, for example, allows juvenile 
offenders less than four years older than their victims to petition for full 
relief immediately after completing their prison sentence or the court-
ordered registration period.276 Similarly, Florida allows juvenile offenders 
no more than four years older than their victims (older than 13 years old) 
to petition for immediate relief.277 In contrast, neither Georgia nor New 
Hampshire provides any specific provisions to appeal sex offender 
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registration imposed in criminal court.278 Neither Georgia nor New 
Hampshire, however, provide for imposing sex offender registration in 
juvenile adjudications.279 
Although an increased number of states with provisions for appeal 
would alleviate some of the burden sex offender registration places on 
juveniles, this solution is not ideal. Without a compelling justification for 
punishing adolescents engaged in consensual peer sexual relationships 
(later found in violation of internet solicitation statutes280), any time spent 
on a sex offender registry is harmful. Nevertheless, a meaningful appeal—
after a demonstration of reform—at least provides juvenile offenders a 
chance they may never otherwise get: to get back their lives. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The internet has changed immeasurably in the decades since internet 
solicitation statutes were drafted.281 The intervening years have seen 
significant changes to the registration of sex offenders, namely: the 
inclusion of juveniles.282 In response to these societal developments, 
legislatures must take action to prevent adolescents from becoming the by-
catch of these statutes.283 By failing to address the consequences of internet 
solicitation statutes, legislatures will continue punishing adolescents for 
their chosen means of communication: the internet. To prevent this 
modern tragedy, state legislatures must revise their internet solicitation 
statutes. Until then, my advice to our modern Romeo is this: go to her 
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